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NOTES

Ireland's Divorce Bill:
Traditional
Irish and International Norms of
Equality and Bodily Integrity at Issue
in a Domestic Abuse Context

ABSTRACT

On November 24, 1995, the Irishpopulation voted to ease
Ireland's constitutional ban on divorce by means of a
constitutionalamendment. The new amendment and the bill
that effectuates it give Irish citizens a limited legal right to end
their marriagesfor the first time in Ireland's history. The
limits surroundingIrish divorce consist of a significantwaiting
period, a living-apart requirement, and a slant toward
mediation.
This Note explores the predicaments of abused spouses
and the unique risks that Ireland's divorce limitationspose to
spousal abuse victims seeking to end their marriages. This
Note argues that the limitations of Ireland's newly created
right of divorce potentially violates battered Irish spouses'
rights to equal protection and bodily integrity under Irish
constitutional jurisprudence, the European Convention on
Human Rights, and developing international norms
articulatedin the Women's Convention.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In 1937, Eamon de Valera drafted the Irish Constitution
using text that explicitly highlighted the favored status of the
Although Ireland
Roman Catholic Church within Ireland. 1
ultimately dropped this express language of favoritism, its
Catholic-based tenets remained in the Constitution. 2 One such
tenet, found in Article 41, provided that "[n]o law shall be enacted
providing for the grant of a dissolution of marriage." 3 Operating
under this prohibition, Ireland was, excepting Malta, the only
4
European country outlawing divorce.
On November 24, 1995, the Irish population voted on a
referendum proposing to ease the prohibition on divorce by
constitutional amendment.5
The opposing sides of the

1.
John Macleod, FaithfulDaughter of Mother Church, HERALD (Glasgow),
Nov. 28, 1995, at 23, availablein LEXIS, News Library, GHERLD File.
2.
See id.
3.
IR. CONST. art 41, § 3, cl. 2.
4.
See Ray Moseley, A Changing Ireland Votes on Divorce; Many Have New
Partnersbut Can'tEnd Old Marriages,CHI. TRIB., Nov. 24, 1995, at 1, available in
LEXIS, News Library, CHTRIB File. For a discussion of the practical effect of the
divorce ban in Ireland as well as a description of alternative separation
mechanisms, see generally ALAN JOSEPH SHATTER, FAMILY LAW INTHE REPUBLIC OF
IRELAND 1 (1977).

5.
For an overview of the history of divorce in Ireland, see Anna Margaret
McDonough, When Irish Eyes Aren't Smiling-Legalizing Divorce in Ireland, 14

DICK. J. INT'L L. 647, 647-55 (1996).
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proper accommodation is provided, that removals are effected in

satisfactory conditions of hygiene, health, safety and nutrition,
and that members of the same family are not separated." 14 2
Additionally, protected persons shall not be detained "in an area
particularly exposed to the dangers of war unless the security of
the population or imperative reasons so demand." 14 3
Several of these rights and prohibitions are mirrored in
Articles 5 ("Persons Whose Liberty Has Been Restricted") and 17
("Prohibition of Forced Movement of Civilians") of Protocol II to the
1949 Geneva Conventions, which is applicable in an armed
conflict not of an international character and reaches one's own
nationals. 14 In all cases, persons protected by Geneva law are to
14 6
be treated humanely. 14 5 In no case is murder permitted.

V.

CONCLUSION

Serious violations of basic human rights and humanitarian
law occur in Sri Lanka when food, medicine, and medical supplies
are used as political weapons. Those least able to cope, especially
children, are the primary victims of such criminal tactics. Such
denials must be exposed, and the Country Reports should
address the misuse of food and medicine and medical supplies in
Sri Lanka and wherever else such illegal weapons are employed.
Arbitrary and inhumane detention and controls of persons
also occur in Sri Lanka, mostly at the hands of government
officials, officers, or agents. These are partially reported, but
greater effort should be made to report all suspected violations of
human rights and humanitarian law relevant to non-arbitrary
and humane treatment of persons as well as their impact on
children and others exposed to grave danger.
Under Article 56 of the U.N. Charter, members have a legal
obligation to respect and to ensure respect for human rights such
as the rights to food and basic medical care. Similarly, under
common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, signatories
have an obligation to respect and to ensure respect for
Convention precepts "in all circumstances." 14 7 It is time for the
international community to recognize that, in addition to

142.
143.

I&
Id.

144.
See Geneva Protocol II, supranote 3, arts. 5 & 17.
145.
See, e.g., Geneva Civilian Convention, supranote 2, art. 3.
146.
Id. (prohibiting "violence to life and person, in particular murder of all
kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture"); Geneva Protocol I, supra note 1,
art. 75(2)(a), (b); Geneva Protocol II, supra note 3, art. 4(2)(a); Geneva Civilian
Convention, supra note 2, arts. 32, 147.
147.
Geneva Civilian Convention, supranote 2, art. 1.
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medicine and medical supplies, food should always be treated as
neutral property during an armed conflict. Because of highly
predictable consequences, both short-term and long-term, food
should never be used as a weapon of war. Moreover, the
international community should strive to assure that corridors for
the free passage of food and medicine and medical supplies are
negotiated or imposed during any armed conflict.
For the
children and others who suffer, criminal and civil sanctions are
inadequate and come too late, if at all.
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referendum warred throughout the pre-vote stage of the process. 6
On the "anti" side of the referendum, Catholic fundamentalists
campaigned that a favorable vote would (1) erode the family-based
morals of Ireland, (2) encourage divorce, and (3) unjustly harm
7
the children and non-earning spouses of the first marital unit,

many of whom entered into the familial relationship with
8

constitutionally supported expectations of permanence.
On the "pro" side, the government argued that the
referendum would allow large numbers of already separated

citizens to obtain marital benefits in more promising subsequent

relationships. 9 Furthermore, referendum proponents argued that
a "yes" vote would facilitate the peace process in Northern Ireland
by maldng the country more inclusive of non-Catholic ideals.' 0

To buttress its position, the government emphasized in
informational materials that the Irish divorce law would protect
the "first family" by maintaining existing separation benefits. I'
The referendum passed by the closest margin of any such
vote since the inception of the 1937 Constitution.' 2
After

6.
For an analysis of the contentious atmosphere surrounding the
referendum process, see generally Boyd Tonkin, Dublin's Splitting Headache, NEw
STATESMAN & SocY', Dec. 1, 1995, at 22.
7.
See Ad Hoc Commission on Referendum Information, Cases for and
Against
Divorce
(1995)
(visited
Mar.
24,
1998)
<http://nis.rtctallaght.ie/sig/law.home/divorce2.html> [hereinafter Cases for and Against].
8.
For an elaboration on the "contractual" flavor of this argument against
divorce, see McDonough, supra note 5, at 664 (analogizing the expectation of a
permanent marriage length to an agreed contractual term of duration found in
any other contract).
9.
See Cases for and Against, supra note 7. The family of the first
marriage was termed the "first family" throughout the referendum process.
10.
See generally Michael J. Farrell, Irish Vote for Divorce Ends Era of
Church's Social Dominance, NAT[L CATH. REP., Dec. 8, 1995, at 19 (stating that the
question of Northern Ireland 'loomed like a dark cloud over the debate"). The
problems within Ireland are largely the result of religious difference and are
entrenched firmly in the history of that nation. A full analysis of these problems
and the impact the Divorce Bill will have on them is largely speculative and
beyond the scope of this Note. For an analysis of the roots of the violence
problem in Ireland, see Ronald A. Christaldi, The Shamrock and the Crown:
A HistoricAnalysis of the Framework Document and Prospectsfor Peace in Ireland,
5 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POLY 123, 124-53 (1995).
11.
See, e.g., Ireland to Vote on Whether to Legalize Divorce (NPR radio

broadcast, Nov. 23, 1995), availablein LEXIS, News Library, NPR File.
12.

Richard Savill, Irish Vote for Divorce Faces Legal Challenge, DAILY

TELEGRAPH, Nov. 27, 1995, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, TELEGR File.

The margin of victory was 9114 of 1.6 million voters. A previous referendum that
sought to amend Article 41 of the Constitution failed with 63% against and 36%
in favor. Id.
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became the Fifteenth
surviving a court challenge, divorce
13
Amendment to Ireland's Constitution.
On November 20, 1996, the Irish legislature passed the
Family Law Divorce Bill (Divorce Bill) to effectuate the new
amendment. 14 Among the dictates of the Divorce Bill, Section 5
provides that, prior to the grant of divorce, the spouses seeking
divorce must have lived apart for a total of four of the previous
five years. In addition to Section 5 and numerous provisions
surrounding spousal support issues, the Divorce Bill also
contains safeguards to ensure that spouses are advised of the
alternative of private settlement via mediation. is
In Ireland, the problem of domestic abuse is severe and
pronounced, 1 6 yet the interests of spousal abuse victims were
noticeably absent from the debate surrounding the Divorce Bill's
passage.17 At first glance, the introduction of divorce seems to
create a new weapon for Irish women seeking escape from an
abusive marital predicament;1 8 however, on closer examination,
the Divorce Bill arguably discriminates against battered spouses
in a fashion that subjects them to a risk of continued and
increased violence. This apparent discrimination exists because
the Divorce Bill, by virtue of its broad application to all divorcing
spouses, subjects battered spouses to the same waiting periods
In an
and mediation possibilities as non-battered spouses.
abusive domestic environment, such divorce delays and courtsuggested dispute alternatives have a deleterious impact not
found in abuse-free marital contexts.19
Part II of this Note focuses on the equality guarantees under
Article 40.1 of the Irish constitution 2" and analyzes the ways in
which Irish notions of equality are at odds with the Divorce Bill in
a domestic abuse context. The analysis centers on the Irish
jurisprudence that shaped the contours of Article 40.1 and ways
in which the Divorce Bill's waiting period and mediation

13.
The court action against the referendum hinged on the government's
expenditure of tax revenue in an attempt to sway the outcome of the vote.
Hanafin v. Minister for the Env't (Ir. S.C. 1996), availablein LEXIS, Irend Library,
CASES File. While the Supreme Court of Ireland did hold that the government
acted unconstitutionally in its funding of a pro-divorce information campaign, it
held that such action was not shown to have materially affected the referendum

outcome. Id.
14.
15.

Family Law (Divorce) Bill, No. 32(c) (1996) [hereinafter Divorce Bill].
Id.§§6,7.

16.
See infranote 49.
17.
See generally Cases for and Against, supra note 7 (outlining the
arguments for divorce legislation-highlighting restrictions and economic
considerations).

18.
19.
20.

See generallyIR. CONsT. art. 41, § 3, cl. 2.
See infra Part II.
IR. CONsT. art. 40, § 1; see infra Part II.
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provisions potentially depart from Ireland's historic ideals of
equality. Part II also examines the same provisions with regard to
traditional Irish notions of the right to life and bodily integrity
guaranteed by Article 40.3 of the Irish constitution. 21
This
analysis concludes that the waiting period and mediation sections
of the Divorce Bill conflict with bodily integrity and right to life
jurisprudence decided prior to the passage of the Divorce Bill.

Part III of this Note examines the same legislative sections
under the European Convention on Human Rights, with
particular focus on Article 8 and its provisions protecting private
and family life. 2 2 This Part argues that, in light of European
Court of Human Rights case law and international human rights
norms, the Divorce Bill is inconsistent with the European
Convention on Human Rights with regard to battered spouses.

II. THE DIVORCE BILL AND THE IRISH CONSTITUTION
A. Equality Under the Law
Article 40.1 of the Irish Constitution provides that "[a]ll
citizens shall, as human persons, be held equal before the law.
This shall not be held to mean that the State shall not in its
enactments have due regard to differences of capacity, physical
and moral, and of social function. "2 3 Akin to the Equal Protection
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, Article 40.1 addresses state
action 2 4 that discriminates against certain classes of individuals
25
that fit within the judiciary's interpretation of the article.
26
Eamon de Valera, the drafter of the constitutional language,
described the mandate of the article as twofold: (1) a guarantee of
impartiality of judges and (2) a recognition of the notion that
differences of capacity and social function within classes can

21.
IR. CONST. art. 40, § 3, cls. 1, 2; see infra Part I.C (discussing the
divorce bill and the constitutional right of bodily integrity).
22.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, § 1, art. 8, 213 U.N.T.S. 220 [hereinafter European
Convention]. See infra Part HI.
23.
IR.CONST. art. 40, § 1.
24.
See GERARD HOGAN & GERRY WHYTE, THE IRISH CONSTITUTION 716-17
(J.M. Kelly ed., 3d ed. 1994) (analyzing who the addressees of Article 40.1 are,
and concluding that this provision is primarily addressed to the State).
25.
Some argued the general nature of the provision's language would lead
to unclear standards for decision-making. Id. at 712.

26.

See supranote 1.
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mandate the need for differing legal treatment.2 7 This section is
interpreted as applying not only to the actual application of laws,
28
but also to the process of enactment.
As a practical matter, determining exactly what de Valera's
guarantee ensures is a diffuse and, at times, contradictory
undertaking; 2 9 however, an analysis of cases decided prior to the
passage of the Divorce Bill establishes the contours of the equality
doctrine relevant for a discussion of the bill in a spousal abuse
context.
As a general rule, Irish jurisprudence surrounding Article
40.1 addressed the permissibility of legislation treating
30
individuals differently on the basis of some sort of classification.
The general question in those cases was whether the constitution
allowed the classification at issue.
In State (Nicolaou) v. An Bord Uctitala, a natural father
brought suit under the Adoption Act of 1952 (Adoption Act)
alleging that it violated the Article 40.1 guarantee of equality
under the law.3 1 The father argued that the statute discriminated
against him because it allowed only the mother to be heard in
adoption cases involving illegitimate children.3 2 Interpreting the
second sentence of Article 40.1, the court held that the Adoption
Act did not violate the equality principle.3 3 The court stated that
a natural father, in an "out of wedlock" context, differed in social
function and moral capacity from individuals who had hearing
rights under the Adoption Act. This difference in social function
34
and moral capacity justified the difference in treatment.
Similarly, in O'Brien v. Keogh, Section 49 of the Statute of
Limitations was challenged under Article 40.1.
The plaintiff
argued that the statute discriminated because it treated children

27.
See HOGAN & WHYTE, supra note 24, at 712 (discussing de Valera's
reply to critics during constitutional debates concerning Article 40.1).
28.
Id.
29.
See, e.g., Brennan v. Attorney Gen. [1983] I.L.R.M. 449 (Ir. H. Ct.
1983), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, IRECAS file (stating that equality is a
"most difficult and elusive" concept).
30.
See infra notes 32-41 and accompanying text. See generally In Re
Philip Clarke [1950] I.R. 235 (Ir. S.C. 1951), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library,
IRECAS File; Landers v. Attorney Gen., 109 I.L.T.R. 1 (Ir. H. Ct. 1975), available in
LEXIS, Intlaw Library, IRECAS File; Mhic Mhatuna v. Ireland [1989] I.R. 504 (Ir.
H. Ct. 1989), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, IRECAS File (all cases upholding
differences in treatment based on differences in capacity or social function).
31.
State (Nicolaou) v. An Bord Uchtala [1966] I:R. 567 (Ir. H. Ct. 1966),
available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, IRECAS File.
32.
Id. at 641.
33.
Id.
34.
Id. The court stated that the purpose of the legislation in question was
to "redress the inequalities imposed by circumstances on orphans and illegitimate
children." Id. at 642.

1998]

IRELAND'S DIVORCE BILL

in parental custody differently than children who were not in
parental custody. 35 The court held that the distinct treatment
afforded to children not in parental custody was consistent with
Article 40.1 because the children at issue were
under a
36
"disability" compared to children under parental care.
In both cases, the court used an equality-based doctrine to
uphold differing treatment for individuals in distinct moral, social,
or physical predicaments. The relevant question with regard to
the Divorce Bill is whether the equality doctrine mandates distinct
treatment for those who are in such predicaments. De Valera's
comments surrounding Nicolaou, O'Brien, and the drafting of
40.137 all seem to answer this question in the affirmative.

Irish legal scholars have interpreted de Valera's statements
surrounding the drafting of Article 40.1 as requiring distinct
38
treatment of individuals of different capacity or social function.
The court in Nicolaou supported this analysis when it interpreted
Article 40.1 as follows:
Section 1 of Article 40 is not to be read as a guarantee or

undertaking that all citizens shall be treated by the law as equal for
all purposes... [. I]nequality may or must result from ... some
deficiency or from some special need and it is clear that the Article
does not either envisage or guarantee equal measure in all things
to all citizens. To do so regardless of the factors mentioned would
9
be inequality.3

The court reiterated this interpretation in O'Brien, quoting the
passage above in its entirety. 4 ° From these sources, it appears
that the Irish Constitution embodies the notion that equality

before the law requires distinct treatment of individuals in
41
different situations by reason of capacity or social function.

35.
O'Brien v. Keogh [19721 I.R. 144, 154 (Ir. S.C. 1972), available in
LEXIS, Intlaw Library, IRECAS File.
36.
Id. at 154-56. Again, as in the Nicolaou case, the O'Brien court found
that the distinct treatment at issue served to better "establish equality between
the two groups." IdL at 150.
37.
See supranote 27 and accompanying text.
38.
See HOGAN & WHYTE, supra note 24, at 724-26 (discussing the concept
of equality before the law as mandating differential treatment in certain
situations).
39.
Nicolaou [1966] I.R. at 639.
40.
O'Brien [1972] I.R. at 148-49.
41.
But see O'Brien v. Mfg. & Eng'g Co. [1973] I.R. 334, 364-66 (Ir. S.C.
1973); State (Hartley) v. Governor of Mountjoy Prison (Jr. S.C. 1967), available in
LEXIS, Intlaw Library, IRECAS File; East Donegal Coop. v. Attorney Gen., [1970]
I.R. 317, 350-351 (fr. S.C. 1970), available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, IRECAS File
(both cases arguing that if all members of a determined class are treated equally
then the equality principle is satisfied). For a critique of these cases, see HOGAN &
WHYTE, supra note 24, at 735-37 (implying that such cases are wrongly decided
because of the court's failure to state that before an examination of equality of
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B. The TraditionalEqualityDoctrine and the Divorce Bill

in the Context of Domestic Abuse
Under the Divorce Bill, battered spouses seeking divorce are
43
42
subject to the same waiting period and mediation possibilities
as spouses who are not abuse victims. Arguably, this differential
conflicts with the apparent constitutional ideal that differences in
individual capacity may mandate distinct treatment under the
4
law. 4
Battered women often have different physical and mental
capacities than women who have not been abused. 4 5 These
differences make battered women particularly vulnerable in
divorce contexts where long waiting periods and mediation are
part of the divorce regime. The Divorce Bill, however, treats all
spouses seeking divorce as a class subject to the same treatment.
This equality of treatment includes a minimum four-year delay
before a grant of divorce as well as provisions providing for
mediation.4 s
Therefore, the Divorce Bill appears to treat
dissimilar individuals in a like manner-a result arguably

contrary to Ireland's constitutional notions of equality.

Spousal abuse is a serious problem that escalates yearly
within Ireland, particularly with regard to violence perpetrated by
husbands4 7 against their wives. 48 Not surprisingly, Irish courts

treatment is properly made, the class to which the law applies must first be
properly drawn).
42.
Family Law (Divorce) Bill, No. 32(c), § 5 (1996) [hereinafter Divorce
Bill].

43.

Id. §§ 6, 7.

44.
See supranote 39 and accompanying text. While scholars have noted
that differences in capacity should mandate different treatment under equality
principles, the Irish judiciary embraced this concept in dicta in cases such as
Nicolaou and O'Brien. Indeed, some Irish Supreme Court opinions indicate that
similar treatment of a broad class satisfies the equality doctrine. These opinions,
however, ignore the reality that some classes are improperly drawn by
incorporating individuals laboring under physical or social obstacles that render
their inclusion within the broad class unrealistic. Scholars challenge these
somewhat illogical decisions by arguing that equality under the law mandates
valid construction of classes subject to statutory treatment.
45.
See infra notes 58-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of
unique difficulties encountered by battered spouses who contemplate or attempt
termination of abusive marriages.
46.
Divorce Bill, §§ 5-7 (1996).
47.
The analysis regarding the Divorce Bill and domestic violence
frequently discusses spousal abuse against women because of practicality
considerations. The sources on the subject of domestic abuse and mediation
focus predominantly on battered women. This does not mean, however, that the
relevant equal protection or subsequent bodily integrity arguments apply only to
cases in which domestic violence victims are female.
48.
See Padraig O'Morajn, Violence Against Women Debated, IR. TIMES, Nov.
27, 1996, at 4 (stating that a quarter of all murders of women in Ireland involve
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issue more restraining orders in domestic abuse cases every
year. 4 9 It is within this context that the Divorce Bill operates.
One of the major aspects of the Divorce Bill is its emphasis on
mediation and reconciliation. Including these provisions can be
seen as an effort by pro-divorce campaigners to make the Divorce
Bill more attractive to the anti-divorce faction,5 0 an attempt to
ease the case load of a struggling family law system, 5 1 or a
combination of both.
In domestic violence cases, however,
mediation works an injustice against the battered spouse, who

usually is the wife.

Generally, in mediation, the divorce dispute is resolved
between the spouses in face-to-face meetings5 2 that usually are
cheaper than traditional litigation methods sS Within this dispute
resolution system, discussions on issues of fault are typically
deterred by steering the parties away from discussing blame and
past conduct. 5 4 These sessions usually are not attended by
attorneys.5 5
Successful mediation is premised on equal
56
bargaining power, mediator neutrality, and confidentiality.
Battered women, however, are not equals for mediation
purposes. Men who batter women often do so to attain and
exercise dominance and control over them.5 7
Within these

the killing of a wife by a husband); Loma Siggins, Domestic Violence Against
Women Increases, IR. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1996, at 4 (reporting that one in five Irish
women suffers from domestic abuse).
49.
See Kathy Sheridan, It Was a Year When Ireland Seemed a More
Dangerous Place to be a Woman, IR. TIMES., Dec. 28, 1996, at Supp. at 4.
(showing that restraining orders increased by over 50% in less than one year with
the introduction of new restraining order legislation).
50.
See Cases for and Against, supranote 7 (suggesting that the legislation
avoided "quickie" divorce).
51.
See Carol Coulter, Family Law Systems Now 'Chronic, IR. TIMES, Apr.
18, 1996, at 7 (suggesting that mediation is the preferred course in Irish family
law due to a system-wide lack of resources).
52.
See David B. Chandler, Violence, Fear, and Communication: The
Variable Impact of Domestic Violence on Mediation, 7 MEDIATION Q. 331 (1990)
(discussing the mediation process).

53.

See id. at 332.

54.

See Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative:Process Dangersfor Women,

100 YALEL.J. 1545, 1563 (1991).

55.
See id. at 1599-1600 (analyzing the negative impact the absence of
counsel in mediations can have); see also Chandler, supranote 52, at 332 (stating
that counsel are usually not present in mediation proceedings).
56.
See Barbara J. Hart, Gentle Jeopardy: The FurtherEndangerment of
Battered Women and Children in Custody Mediation, 7 MEDIATION Q. 317, 318
(1990) (describing equality of bargaining power in the mediation context); see also
Mary Pat Treuthart, In Harms Way? Family Mediation and the Role of the Attorney
Advocate, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 717, 729-31 (1993) (providing an analysis of
neutrality and confidentiality in mediation).
57.
See Hart, supra note 56, at 318 (citing numerous studies regarding
power and control as central characteristics of the batterer).
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relationships, the abused party often succumbs to the abuser's
wishes out of a fear of, and a desire to avoid, subsequent or
increased violence. s8 Over time, the battered woman develops
feelings of a "learned helplessness" marked by traits of passivity
she uses as a survival tactic. 5 9 In such situations, a cycle
commonly develops in which the battered woman leaves the

abusive setting only to return out of a sense of love, as a result of
promises by the abuser to reform, or as a result of threatened
additional violence. 60 Often, battered women suffer feelings of
guilt that they have somehow ruined the marriage, thereby
61
increasing their conciliatory propensities.
On the other hand, abusers are often control-oriented 6 2 and
possess the ability to deceive outside observers. 63 Their behavior,
far from passive, is marked by skilled manipulation, threats, and
coercion.
This power is often exercised in a fashion only
64
understood by the wife as controlling behavior.
This marked imbalance in power renders mediation in such
circumstances largely unworkable. 6 5 Where violence is part of a
relationship, bargaining power is not equal, but instead is slanted
toward the control-oriented abuser. 6 6 Battered women in such
situations give up legal rights either out of fear 6 7 or out of an
inability to articulate what they want. 68
This danger is

58.
See id. at 319. The author included a description of a woman who
complied with mediation out of fear arising from past abuse. Id.
59.
60.

61.
62.
& James
Mediation,

LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 33 (1984).
See DEL MARTIN, BATTERED WIVEs 72-82 (1981).

See id. at 81-82.
See Hart, supranote 56, at 319; see also Kathleen O'Connell Corcoran
C. Melamed, From Coercion to Empowerment: Spousal Abuse and
7 MEDIATION Q. 303, 305 (1990) (discussing the extent to which

batterers exhibit control over the victim).
63.
See Hart, supra note 56, at 320 (describing the persuasive capabilities
of abusers).
64.
See id.
65.
See supranote 56 and accompanying text.
66.
See Treuthart, supranote 56, at 729.

67.
See supranote 58; see also M.D.A. Freeman, England:Back to Basics,
33 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 329, 341 (1995) (articulating that mediation is a way
for the abuser to get what he wants through violence).
68.
See generally William L.F. Felsteiner et al., The Emergence and
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming ....
15 L. & SocY REV.
631, 633 (1980-81). This work describes the inability of certain parties to 'name"
injuries because they cannot identify wrongs committed against them. Id.
Additionally, people often cannot "blame" others for injuries either as a result of

their capacity or existing barriers. Both "naming" and "blaming" are elements of
the "claiming" portion of dispute resolution. See also Grillo, supranote 54, at 61
(analyzing the above framework in a mediation context where "blaming" is
excluded from the process, making "claiming" problematic, if not impossible).
Even without such process barriers to "blaming," battered women might not be
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exacerbated when parties are not represented 6 9 and where
discussions of past abuse are off limits in the spirit of
70
negotiation.
Furthermore, the ideal of neutrality in mediation is strained
in domestic abuse cases. In such situations, claims of past
conduct are generally discouraged. If the mediator tolerates
claims of past abuse, however, the mediator must then either
accept or disbelieve the claims.
In so doing, the mediator
jeopardizes neutrality because accepting one version of the abuse
story implies disbelief of the other. Furthermore, the abused
party would perceive a neutral stance toward the abuse as the
tacit condoning of violence by the mediator. 7 1 In such a
circumstance, neutrality is largely impossible.
Additionally, the concept of confidentiality within mediation
disadvantages battered women.
The mediation process, by
maintaining a nondisclosure stance, serves as a form of systemic
privatization of the violence-a result that further subjects the
abused to unfair process. 7 2 It is not surprising, then, that the
idea of mediation in domestic violence situations is widely
chagrined7 3 and has been aptly labeled an "oxymoron." 74
The Divorce Bill's mediation provisions institutionalize these
injustices. By generally encouraging mediation, the Divorce Bill
subjects battered spouses, particularly women, to the risk of
losing legal rights and personal safety in face-to-face
confrontations with their abusers. The statute thus exposes
battered women to dangers other women do not face. This
situation is contrary to Ireland's traditional notions of equal
protection, which include the positive requirement that the
government treat individuals in different situations (by reason of
capacity) differently. 7 5
Furthermore, it is of little intellectual value to claim that the
Divorce Bill's mediation provision avoids these risks to battered
women because the mediation is voluntary. In domestic contexts
where abuse is the norm, battered women are "not free to
choose." 76 Where a relationship is marked by an imbalance of
power, mediation that is summarily labeled as "voluntary"
able to "name" or "blame" by virtue of their "learned helplessness" and other selfesteem issues. See supranotes 59 & 60 and accompanying text.
69.
See supranote 56 and accompanying text.
70.
See GriUo, supranote 54, at 1563.
71.
729-30.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

For the argument regarding neutrality, see Treuthart, supranote 56, at
See id. at 730.
See id. at 721.
See Hart, supranote 56, at 320.
See supranote 39 and accompanying text.
Hart, supra note 56, at 321.
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becomes, in reality, "coercive."77 For impoverished spouses, the
risks of "coerced" mediation are more pronounced due to the
lower costs involved in mediation. 78 Additionally, the Divorce Bill
arguably is slanted toward mediation.
A party seeking or
responding to a filing for divorce is under an obligation to explore
mediation alternatives. Each party must demonstrate, to the
court's satisfaction, that the alternative has been explored, and
failure to make such a demonstration will result in the
adjournment of proceedings until the parties address such

matters.

79

To remedy this inequality in treatment, Ireland's legislature
should revise the Divorce Bill's mediation provisions to treat
abused spouses as a special class by virtue of their unique
capacity or disability. Such treatment should provide that no
mediation occur in cases of domestic violence and that courts
screen for domestic violence to ensure that such mediation does
not take place. 8 0 Such distinct treatment would better comport
with Irish concepts of equality as seen in case law decided before
the Divorce Bill.
The Divorce Bill is also suspect, for equal protection
purposes, by requiring that spouses live apart for four years
before the grant of divorce.8 1 This amounts to a minimum fiveyear waiting period for spouses seeking marital dissolution. This
discriminates against battered spouses in two respects:
82
(1) battered spouses tend to leave and return home cyclically,

77.
Id.; see also Grillo, supra note 54, at 1550 n.12 (articulating the
dangers inherent in voluntary mediation where there is a power imbalance).
78.
See Freeman, supra note 67, at 340 (discussing the negative effect
economic considerations have in a voluntary mediation scheme).
79.
Family Law (Divorce) Bill, No. 32(c), §§ 6, 7 (1996).
80.
It is crucial that systems are in place during a divorce proceeding to
detect spousal abuse. Some scholars call for the use of a conflict assessment
protocol to detect spousal abuse. This process involves specific questioning of the
spouses separately before the start of mediation. For a general overview of
conflict assessment protocol, see Linda K. Girdner, Mediation Triage: Screeningfor
Spouse Abuse in Divorce Mediation, 7 MEDIATION Q. 365 (1990).
Many scholars believe the presence of domestic abuse should foreclose
mediation as an alternative. Other scholars believe mediation is appropriate in
such cases. Those who advocate use of mediation in domestic abuse contexts
agree that such cases must be closely screened and monitored. Along with such

close scrutiny of domestic abuse, advocates of abuse mediation also call for a
form of mediation different from traditional models. For one such opinion, see
Stephen K. Erickson & Marilyn S. McKnight, Mediating Spousal Abuse Divorces,
7 MEDIATION Q. 377 (1990). For an overview of mediation, its risks to abused
wives, and the need for rigorous abuse screening, see Lisa C. Lerman, Mediation
of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution on
Women, 7 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 57, 61-71, 81-88, 100-110 (1984).
81.
See Lerman, supranote 80, at 85 (discussing the Divorce Bill).
82.
See MARTIN, supranote 60, at 82.

1998]

IRELAND'S DIVORCE BILL

655

and (2) battered spouses are at risk of continued violence and,
therefore, need to terminate the relationship more quickly than
83
spouses who are not battered.
A crucial step in getting out of an abusive marriage is
obtaining a divorce. In such cases, the need for a rapid divorce is
paramount.8 4 Mandatory waiting periods are often rationalized as
the preferred course in divorce because they provide for improved
reflection and may serve to dissuade couples from divorce.8 5 In
Ireland, the government touted waiting periods as a means to
make divorce more difficult.8 6 This argument, however, fails to
take account of the dangers battered spouses face as well as their
predilections for returning to their abusers.
Women in such
situations face greater risks of serious injury the longer the
marriage continues.8 7
These risks are particularly pronounced
under the Divorce Bill because the bill requires not only a
mandatory waiting period, but also that the period consist of four
years of separation time. As previously discussed, permanently
leaving home is contrary to the general nature of the battered
woman and, as a consequence, makes divorce even more unlikely.
Therefore, the Divorce Bill's waiting period places battered
spouses in a disadvantaged position compared to the non-abused
spouse.
This result conflicts with Irish notions of differing
treatment for individuals with distinct capacities.
Proponents of extended waiting periods argue that such
periods are justified when the government provides alternative
separation mechanisms.8 8 This argument lacks "common sense,
not to mention common decency. "8 9
Ireland has such a
mechanism in the Judicial Separation and Family Law Reform Act
of 1989 (Separation Act);90 however, the equal protection

83.
Linda J. Lacey, Mandatory Marriage 'For the Sake of the Children":
A Feminist Reply to Elizabeth Scott, 66 TUL. L. REv. 1435, 1442 (1992).
84.
Id. at 1445.
85.
See generally Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About
Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REv. 9, 92-93 (1990) (discussing the need for
higher cost consequences in failed marriages).
86.
See Cases for and Against, supra note 7. The promotional material
states that there will be no "quicde" divorce. Id. This material also lists the
restrictive nature of the Divorce Bill as one of its attractive elements.
87.
See Lacey, supra note 83, at 1444-45 (citing WILLIAM A. STACEY &
ANSON D. SHUPE, THE FAMILY SECRET: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 47 (1983)).
Many feel that irrational feelings of hurt or anger motivate spouses to terminate
marriages.
Scott, supra note 85, at 92-93.
Lacey argues that such
characterizations discourage legal systems from adequately defending the bodily
rights of abused spouses. Lacey, supranote 83, at 1443-46.
88.
Lacey, supranote 83, at 1444-46.
89.

MARTIN, supra note 60, at 166 (maligning the availability of alternative

separation mechanisms as impractical).
90.
Judicial Separation and Family Law Reform Act, No. 6 (1989).
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arguments applicable against the Divorce Bill also militate against
the Separation Act in domestic violence contexts. The Separation
Act contains the same mediation language and presents the same
procedural dangers and inequities to battered women as does the
Divorce Bill. 9 1
Additionally, the separation requirement also
92
considers periods of living apart prior to the grant of separation.
Again, this requirement ignores the battered spouse's conciliatory
nature and makes such a separation harder to attain. Generally,
a final divorce and settlement is the most feasible way to best
93
protect a battered woman and help her escape the violent home.
It is facially attractive to argue that the Divorce Bill does not
violate traditional equality principles because divorce was
previously unavailable. Article 40.1 provides that the guarantee of
equality applies to the legislative product of Ireland. 94 Therefore,
it is incumbent on the legislature to produce laws that treat
individuals even handedly, regardless of whether the subject
matter addressed by the laws constitutes a newly formed right.
The Divorce Bill does not treat battered spouses equally because,
by requiring divorcing spouses to wait a minimum of four years,
the statute exposes abused spouses to risks that other spouses do
not face. Furthermore, by requiring divorcing spouses to live
apart, the statute discriminates against abused spouses,
particularly women, by failing to take account of their distinct
incapacity to avoid returning to the home.
To make the Divorce Bill more consistent with Irish equality
principles, the government should significantly reduce the waiting
period and waive the living-apart requirement. This approach

would better equalize the treatment of a class of citizens currently
at a disadvantage in Irish family law because of their unique
incapacity. Such provisions exist in the legislative regimes of
other jurisdictions and would better serve Ireland's historic
95
equality principles.

91.

Id. at§ 5.

92.
Id. at § 52(c), -(d), -(e), § 4(2). Particularly noteworthy is § 4(2), which
allows the court to consider cohabitation periods greater than six months as
evidence that the applicant can reasonably be expected to continue to cohabit
with the respondent.
93.
See Lacey, supranote 83, at 1445.
94.
IR. CONST. art. 40, § 1.
See Rachel Borrill, Four Cabinet Members Revolt Over Divorce,IR. TIMES,
95.
Apr. 26, 1996, at 11 (describing a British bill that provides for shorter waiting
periods in cases of domestic violence).
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C. PersonalRights of Life and Bodily Integrity
and the Divorce Bill at Odds
The waiting period and mediation provisions of the Divorce
Bill arguably conflict in a domestic abuse context, with personal
rights, guaranteed by Article 40.3 of the Irish constitution. Article
40.3 provides:
(1)

The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far

as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal
rights of the citizen.
(2)
The State shall, in particular, by its laws protect as best
it may from unjust attack and, in the case of injustice done,
vindicate the life, person, good name, and property rights of every
96
citizen.

Initially, the judiciary viewed this article as a general
proclamation to the legislature that presented no decipherable
criterion for judicial review; 97 however, the judiciary altered this
non-interventionist approach and subsequently used Article 40.3
to articulate the nature of personal rights and the extent to which
those rights mandate legislative protection.9" Among the rights in
Article 40.3, the right to life and the related right to bodily
integrity are at issue for battered spouses seeking a divorce under
the new bill.
The Irish judiciary, in the course of its Article 40.3 doctrinal
development, created two classes of rights that fall under the
aegis of the article:
specific and unspecified. 9 9
Among the
specific rights listed in the second clause of Article 40.3 is the
right to life. The first case that gave the right to life doctrinal
°
form was McGee v. Attorney General.'G
In McGee, a woman
suffered from a physical condition that rendered pregnancy highly
dangerous.' 0 ' The woman sought to eliminate the criminality of

96.
97.

IR. CONST. art. 40, § 3, cls. 1, 2.
See HOGAN & WHYTE, supranote 24, at 745-46. In fact, for the first 25

years after the Constitution was ratified, the rights discussed in the first clause
went undefined. See id. at 746. The Irish Supreme Court stated that any attempt
to ascertain the meaning of the first clause would constitute a "usurpation of
[legislative] authority." Id. at 745 (quoting In re Article 26 and the Offences
Against the State (Amendment) Bill, 1940, [1940] I.R. 470)).
98.
See HOGAN & WHYTE, supranote 24, at 746-48.
99.
Generally, the specified rights are found in the second clause of Article
40.3. The right to life is included therein. See id. at 749. Unspecified rights are

those the judiciary deems ancillary to those specified in the second clause or that
the judiciary deems latent in the term "personal rights" in the first clause. See id.

at 755.
100. McGee v. Attorney Gen. [1974] I.R. 284, available in LEXIS, Intlaw
Library, IRECAS File.
101. The woman suffered from a tendency to toxemia. Id. at 289.
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contraception in her case because of the risks that pregnancy
posed to her life. 1 2 The court held that the woman did have a
right to life and articulated the nature of the protection that such
a right deserves, stating:
One of the personal rights of a woman in plaintiff's state of health
would be a right to be assisted in her efforts to avoid putting her
life in jeopardy. I am of the opinion that not only has the State the

right to do so, but, by virtue of the... terms of 53 of Article 40, the
State has the positive obligationto ensure by its laws.., that there
would be made available to a married woman in the condition of
health of the plaintiff the means whereby a conception which was
likely to put her life in jeopardy might be avoided .... 103

The court also cautioned that such a right must be balanced
against any countervailing rights, which, in that case, were the
personal rights of the unborn. 14

Following McGee, battered spouses have a strong argument
that the waiting period and mediation provisions of the Divorce
Bill violate their constitutionally protected right to life. Battered
spouses, like the woman in McGee, suffer from a condition that
makes compliance with a law a physically dangerous
proposition.105
In a domestic abuse setting, the statutorily
mandated behavior that gives rise to physical danger is the
continuation of the marital union and the face-to-face negotiation
of the divorce. The Divorce Bill, like McGee's contraception
prohibition, actively hinders at-risk citizens from protecting
themselves by subjecting them to a framework that does not
provide adequate consideration of the special dangers they face.
The court in McGee established that the State has a positive duty
to remove such barriers to personal safety with regard to
individuals who suffer from particularized risks.1 0 6 Therefore, the
Irish legislature arguably is obligated to remove, for abused
spouses, the waiting period and mediation alternatives in the
Divorce Bill. Such action would protect battered spouses' right to
life as articulated in McGee.

102. At issue was a law providing a maximum six-month prison sentence
for "importation" of contraceptives. Id.

103. Id. at 315-16. The court also found that such distinct treatment would
satisfy equality principles because of differences in physical capacity. Therefore,

Article 40.3 mandated distinct treatment to protect life, and the disparate risks of
harm to life justified the Article 40.3 mandate under equality principles. Id. at
313-15.

104.

Id. at 312. This concern for the rights of the unborn was expanded

later. See G. v. An Bord Uchtala [19801 I.R. 32, availablein LEXIS, Intlaw Library,

IRECAS File.
105. See supraPart II.
106.

McGee [1974] I.R. 284 at 314.
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In fact, the argument for legislative revision of the Divorce
Bill may be stronger than that found with regard to the
contraception legislation in McGee. In McGee, the court balanced
the woman's right to life with the personal rights of the
unborn.10 7
In a spousal abuse context, speedier and less
restrictive divorce does not present any such countervailing
personal considerations. Although the abuser could argue that
speedier divorce interferes with his constitutional right to have a
family,1 0 8 such an argument is unworkable.
In State (Bouzagoti)v. Station Sergar, Fitzgibbon Street Garda
Station,10 9 a woman did not want to readmit her husband to the
family. 110 At issue was whether the State should readmit him to
ensure his constitutional right to family life. 1 11 The court held
that a claim of a right to family life is inappropriate in cases of
family division and that the proper analysis in such cases
involves an assessment of individual personal rights as opposed
to collective family rights. 1 12 Similarly, in L. v. L., the court held
that the constitutional right to family life applies to the protection
of the family from external action as opposed to interfamily
behavior. 113
A spouse who files for divorce creates a family division like
that found in Bouzagou. Therefore, the spouse's individual
personal rights are subject to the court's consideration. In a
domestic abuse setting, the battered spouse's individual right to
life is offset only by the abuser's collective interest in a right to

family life.

Therefore, removal of the waiting period and

mediation requirements in the Divorce Bill would protect the
abused's individual right and would not affect any individual right
of the abuser. Furthermore, the protection of the family from
external forces, as in L. v. L., is inapplicable in the private,

107.
McGee [19471 I.R. at 284.
108.
See IR. CONST. art. 41. This article provides that the government
protect the family from attack. Id.
109.
State (Bouzagou) v. Station Sergeant [1985] I.R. 426, available in
LEXIS, Intlaw Library, IRECAS File. The court stated: "[l]t is not a question of
asserting the rights of a family, or even of the parents, as against the outside
world but of reconciling the rights of individual members of the family when the
family itself is divided." Id. at 433. For a discussion of the case, see HOGAN &
WHYTE, supra note 24, at 1005.
110.
Station Sergeant [19851 I.R. at 431. The husband was the subject of a
restraining order due to spousal abuse.
111.
The husband brought claims under Articles 41 and 42. Id. at 433.
112. Id. (finding that this was not a case of "rights of a family ... against the
outside world" but rather of "reconciling the rights of individual members of the

family").
113.
See L. v. L., [1992] I.R. 77 (Ir. S.C. 1992), available in LEXIS, Intlaw
Library, IRECAS File.
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interfamily action of divorce. Therefore, because the abused has
no countervailing personal rights, the court would be more
compelled to find the Divorce Bill more seriously violative of
Article 40.3 than the statute reviewed in McGee.
A closely related doctrine to right to life is the unspecified
right to bodily integrity. In Ryan v. Attorney General,1 1 4 a plaintiff
challenged an Irish statute providing for the fluoridation of
The plaintiff argued that fluoride was dangerous to
water.1 1 5
human health and that the government, by compelling
consumption of fluoridated water, violated her right to bodily
integrity implicit in Article 40.3.116 The court acknowledged that
such an implicit right exists 1 7 but held it was not violated on the
facts. 1 18 The court explained the right of bodily integrity as a
mandate that "no process which is or may, as a matter of
probability, be dangerous or harmful to the life or health of the
citizens or any of them may be imposed (in the sense of being
This
made compulsory) by an Act of the Oireachtas." 1 9
interpretation of the right to bodily integrity is the foundation of
the doctrine and has been cited favorably in subsequent cases. 120
The mediation and waiting period provisions of the Divorce
Bill threaten bodily integrity of battered spouses by prolonging the
abusive relationship and subjecting the abused to a potential
face-to-face confrontation with the abuser. Under Ryan, the Irish
Constitution is violated when an act of the legislature subjects

citizens to the mere probability of danger.121 The provisions of
the Divorce Bill in question subject battered spouses to an
increased probability of danger. The legislature should amend the
Divorce Bill to better protect battered spouses' right to bodily
integrity.
As in the equal protection context, it is attractive to argue
that because divorce was not previously legal, its introduction on
a limited scale cannot violate the Constitution's guarantees to

114.

Ryan v. Attorney Gen., [1965] I.R. 294 (Jr. H. Ct. 1965), available in

LEXIS, Intlaw Library, IRECAS File.
See id.
115.
116.
Id. at 308. The plaintiff also brought claims under Articles 41 and 42.

Id.
117. Id. at 313-14.
118.
Id. at 347-49. The plaintiff did not establish that fluoride levels in Irish
water rose to the point of causing bodily harm. This failure in proof defeated the
claim. Id. at 347.
119.
Id. at 314. The court saw bodily integrity as derivative of the right to
life.
See HOGAN & WHYTE, supra note 24, at 759 (discussing a subsequent
120.
interpretation of the bodily integrity doctrine in State (C.) v. Frawley [1976] I.R.
365).
121. Ryan, [1965] I.R. at 294.
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right to life and bodily integrity.
Logically, an act is not
automatically constitutional merely because it creates a
previously unrecognized right. The language of the constitution
in Article 40.3 applies to legislation. Therefore, if the legislature
creates a new right through a statute, the law must create that
right with respect to citizens' personal safety. In a domestic
abuse setting, the Divorce Bill threatens the personal safety of the
abused and, as a result, the Bill may fail to comport with the
obligations inherent in Article 40.3.

III. THE DIVORCE BILL AND THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
(European Convention) is a powerful instrument of international
law providing for the protection of individual rights.' 2 2 In its
text, the European Convention protects numerous rights 123 of the
citizens of contracting states. 12 4
In application, tribunals
interpret the European Convention in a fashion that responds to
social changes in the area of human rights as those changes
develop. 125
Generally, this interpretive function entails an
assessment of developing norms of human rights measured
against a desire to remain adequately deferential to the individual
states' domestic legislation. 12 6 Tribunals tend to forego such
deferential concerns, however, where it is clear that a right
guaranteed by the European Convention expands or develops new
aspects. 127 To decide if a human rights norm exists, tribunals
have the power to consult many sources. Among the sources

122. European Convention, supra note 22, 213 U.N.T.S. at 222. For a
discussion regarding the power of this document as a human rights tool, see
Laurence R. Heifer, Consensus, Coherence and the European Convention on
Human Rights, 26 CORNELL INTL L.J. 133, 133 (1993) (discussing the almost
universal acceptance of the European Convention); WARWICK A. McKEAN, EQUALITY
AND DISCRIMINATION

UNDER INTERNATIONAL

LAW 204

(1983) (discussing the

European Convention's effectiveness).
123. Rights protected are life; freedom from torture, inhuman treatment or
slavery; liberty; fair public hearings; freedom from retroactive criminal
convictions; respect for private and family life, home, and correspondence;
freedom of thought, religion, expression, and association; freedom to marry and
found a family; and freedom to enjoy the Convention's rights without
discrimination. European Convention, supra note 22, § 1, arts. 2-14, 213
U.N.T.S. at 224-32.
124. For a list of contracting states, see Hefer, supranote 122, at 134 n. 3.
125. See id. at 134 (discussing the concept of "European Consensus" as a

mechanism giving rise to increased human rights protection).
126. See id. at 136-37.
127. See generally id. at 138.

662

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL. 31:643

available to the court are international treaties12 8 and European
Court of Human Rights precedents. 129
Freedom from domestic violence is a right that exists in the
European Convention. In the case of Airey v. Ireland,130 the
European Court of Human Rights recognized the existence of the
right of freedom from domestic violence under Article 8 of the
European Convention, which respects private and family life. 13 1
This right is established further by the 1980 Convention for the
132
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(Women's Convention), an international treaty ratified by every
The Women's Convention, therefore, is a
country in Europe. 13
developing norm in Europe with regard to European Convention
guarantees and, as such, its principles should guide the
European Court with regard to domestic violence. 134
The Divorce Bill violates Article 8 of the European Convention
because it infringes a battered spouse's ability to extricate herself
from a dangerous situation. Airey supports this conclusion.
Furthermore, under the Women's Convention, the Divorce Bill
developing
norms
violence
domestic
violates
clearly
internationally. Under Airey and the Women's Convention, Article
8 of the European Convention dictates that governments
proactively prevent risks associated with domestic violence.
Because long waiting periods and mediation increase domestic
violence risks, the Divorce Bill fails to meet the demands of Article
8. These provisions of the Divorce Bill should be modified to
comport with the European Convention as delineated by case
precedent and developing international norms.

128. See id. at 139-40 (listing international treaties as one of three sources
of finding "European consensus").
See id. at 141-42 (describing the power of a tribunal precedent
129.
articulating a "rights protective" interpretation of the convention with regard to
domestic law).
32 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 4 (1979).
130.
European Convention, supranote 22, § 1, art. 8, 213 U.N.T.S. at 230.
131.
132.
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, G.A. Res 34/1880, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 193, U.N.
Doc. No. A/34146 (1979) [hereinafter Women's Convention].
133.
See Katherine M. Culliton, Finding a Mechanism to Enforce Women's
Right to State ProtectionFrom Domestic Violence in the Americas, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J.

507, 541 (1993) (stating that the only countries in the Western hemisphere not to

ratify are the United States and Bahamas).
134.

See Heifer, supra note 122, at 140. Heifer argues that international

treaties should be consulted by the European Court of Human Rights when there
are close cases regarding to what extent a human rights norm has developed. Id.
at 161.
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A. Airey v. Ireland
In Airey, a woman sought to separate from her husband due
to alleged physical and mental abuse perpetrated against her and
her children. 135
Her attempts were unsuccessful, however,
because of the prohibitive costs of attaining a legal separation in
Ireland.13 6 As a result, the woman lodged a complaint with the
European Commission of Human Rights (Commission) alleging
that the high costs of separation violated Article 6 of the
European Convention by denying her that right of access to court
and Article 14 of the Convention by making judicial separation
"more easily available" to those who can afford to pay for it. She
also argued Articles 8 and 13 were violated.' 3 7 Because the
Commission found that Ireland's separation procedures violated
13 8
Article 6, it did not examine the remaining claims.
The European Court of Human Rights agreed with the
Commission's finding that Ireland breached Article 6 and stated
that the European Convention imposes a positive duty on
contracting states to ensure effective right of access to the
courts.13 9
Additionally, the court found that the complaint
established a violation of Article 8.140 The court held that, under
Irish law, where a spouse is entitled to a separation, the
government has positive obligations to ensure that a spouse can
effectively use the separation mechanism to realize the protection
of Article 8.141 Because of the high costs of separation, it was
inaccessible to individuals, such as the complainant, who could
not afford it. As a result, the court mandated that Ireland

135. Airey, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 6. Allegedly, Mrs. Airey's husband was an
alcoholic who frequently threatened her and occasionally subjected her to
physical abuse. Id.
136. See id. at 7 (outlining the expense of the process).
137. See id. at 8-9; see also European Convention, supranote 22, § 1, arts.
6, 14, 213 U.N.T.S. at 228, 232.
138. See Airey, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 8.
139. Id. at 12-16. The court held that contracting states must provide
counsel to the poor seeking protection of rights covered by the European
Convention if such legal assistance is necessary or effective to the courts. Id. at
14-16.
140. Id. at 17 (citing the Marckx Case, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15, as
authority for the proposition that a government's failure to act can constitute a
violation of Article 8 of the European Convention).
141. Although the court used the terms "effectively accessible" in its
opinion, the opinion refers to the cost elements of the Article 8 argument. Id. For
an overview of the case, see Rebecca J. Cook, International Human Rights Law
Concerning Women: Case Notes and Comments, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 779,
794-96 (1990).
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alleviate the costs to ensure that the complainant could realize
the protection of private and family life guaranteed by Article 8.142
In Airey, the European Court of Human Rights established
that contracting states must make their protections of private and
family life accessible to those who desire to take advantage of the
protection offered. 143 In Ireland, the availability of divorce, like
the availability of a legal separation, falls within the protections of
private and family life contemplated by Article 8 of the European
Convention.
Therefore, under Airey, divorce must be made
accessible to those who seek it. The Divorce Bill fails to meet the
mandates of Article 8 because the Bill makes divorce inaccessible
to victims of domestic violence. The waiting period and mediation
provisions of the Divorce Bill create a barrier to divorce for
battered spouses, much like the high costs that hindered
separation for the poor in Airey.
Following Airey, contracting states are under a positive
obligation to remove barriers inherent in domestic laws

addressing issues covered by the European Convention. 144

In

Airey, Article 8 required that Ireland, a contracting state, alleviate
the high costs of separation when a citizen could not bear those
costs. 145 It follows, therefore, that Article 8 requires Ireland to
alleviate the waiting period and mediation requirements of the
Divorce Bill when those provisions limit an individual's ability to
realize the protection divorce offers. In a domestic abuse setting,
the mediation and waiting period provisions limit the abused
spouse's access to divorce. 14 6
Therefore, Article 8 requires
Ireland to alter those provisions in cases of domestic abuse.
Arguably, the decision of the European Court of Human
Rights in Johnston v. Ireland14 7 militates against this conclusion.
In Johnston, an unmarried couple challenged Ireland's ban on
divorce. The couple, who had been cohabiting at for fifteen years,
wanted the court to recognize the husband's right to end his
previous marriage. 148
The couple claimed Ireland's
constitutional ban on divorce violated the guarantee of respect for
private and family life afforded by Article 8.149 The court found
that Article 8 does require contracting states to make divorce

142. Airey, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 17.
143. Id. at 18.
144. See id.
145. Id. at 17.
146. See supra Part II.B (discussing the fact that abused spouses are
subject to control in mediation and are subject to increased danger the longer an
abusive marriage continues).
147. Case of Johnston and Others, 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 5 (1986).
148. I& at 10-12.
149. Id. at 19.
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available. 150
Although this result is controversial,15 1 it could
lend support to an argument that limited divorce cannot violate
the European Convention when the Convention does not
guarantee any right to divorce.
This argument, however,
misconstrues the Johnston holding and disregards the substance
of the Article 8 doctrine established in Airey.
In Johnston, the European Court of Human Rights found that
contracting states do not have to include divorce as a protection
of Article 8. Under this reasoning, contracting states have some
freedom to decide what mechanisms they will use to respect
private and family life. Therefore, because Ireland had no divorce,
the court deferred to Ireland's judgment that divorce was not
necessary to protect private and family life. The passage of the
Divorce Bill, however, marks a change in the protections
recognized by Ireland and subsequently governed by the
European Convention. Under Airey, when a contracting state
establishes a protection covered by the European Convention's
15 2
articles, that protection must be accessible to all who seek it.
The Divorce Bill, through its waiting period and mediation

provisions, limits abused spouses' access to divorce.

These

barriers to divorce must be removed.
Therefore, while the
European Convention does not require contracting states to allow
divorce, it does require contracting states that allow divorce to
make that right accessible.
B. The Women's Convention
In Airey, the European Court of Human Rights established
that contracting states must act affinmatively to ensure effective
access to domestic protections afforded to individuals under
Article 8 of the European Convention.' 5 3
The Airey opinion,
however, left somewhat unclear the extent to which a government

150.

The court reasoned that respect for family life means access to the

protections afforded families. Because the cohabitants could exercise family
rights, their family life was adequately respected even though they could not
marry. See id. at 26-28.
151. For an analysis of how Johnston was wrongly decided, see generally
Note, Divorce and Remarriage as Human Rights: The Irish Constitution and the
EuropeanConvention on Human Rights at Odds in Johnston v. Ireland, 22 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 63 (1989).

152. Airey, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 12.
153. See Cook, supra note 141, at 817 (stating that the court decisions
explained in her essay "note that the states have positive obligations to ensure an
effective right to private and family life.. ."). Cook argues that states immediately
must reform laws adversely affecting women's rights (as conceptualized by
international instruments) rather than await a court challenge. Id.
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must act in a domestic abuse setting.' 5 4
The Women's
Convention
clarifies
international
expectations
regarding
55
governmental action in domestic violence cases such as Airey.'
Often, the European Court of Human Rights uses such
international materials to ascertain the scope of consensus
concerning developing rights covered by the European
Convention.1 5 6 Therefore, the Women's Convention expands the
protection articulated in Airey because it constitutes an
international consensus of governmental expectations in domestic
abuse cases.
The Women's Convention both confirms and enlarges Airey's
protection of human rights.
First, analysis of the Women's
Convention
supports
Airey's foundational
concept
that
governments must amend legislation that restricts access to
human rights protection.' 5 7
Additionally, the Women's

Convention bolsters Airey's conclusion that domestic abuse is an
infringement of a personal human right.15 8
The Women's
Convention, however, goes further than Airey in specifying
international expectations regarding domestic violence and

154.
See Airey, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 14-17. A litigant could contend that
Airey is limited to financial barriers created by the State as opposed to barriers
inherent in the status of individuals. While it is difficult to see why Airey should
be so limited, such an argument is plausible given the facts of Airey.

International norms, however, support the inference that Airey applies to all
barriers to protection from domestic violence. See General Recommendation,
No. 19, Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, llth Sess., U.N. Doc. (CEDAW/C/1991/L.1/Add. 15 (1992), at para.
24(b) [hereinafter General Recommendation] (recommending that state parties

ensure protection against gender-based and family violence).
155. The Women's Convention call for elaborate legislative reform is not
limited to the removal of barriers to protection from spousal abuse. See infra
notes 161-63.
156. See Helfer, supra note 122, at 139 n.23. Helfer argues that such
reference to international materials is useful in ascertaining the existence of
human rights consensus, particularly when there is wide ratification. Hefler also
argues, however, that such external referencing should be limited to cases where
regional ratification is particularly strong. Id. at 162. Given the Women's
Convention's wide acceptance in the western hemisphere, the Convention is
strong evidence of consensus even within Helfer's limited model. See supra note
129.
157. See Culliton, supra note 133, at 511 (showing that the right to freedom
from domestic violence is not limited to the Women's Convention, but is also
virtually a part of other international legal instruments and customary
international law).
158. The Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW) interprets the Women's Convention as condemning

domestic violence as a violation of "general human rights norms."
Recommendation, supranote 154.

General
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governments' role in protecting against such violence.1 5 9
Therefore, the Women's Convention, ratified in the same year
Airey was decided, 160 helps define the scope of Article 8 protection
contemplated by the European Court of Human Rights in Airey.
The Women's Convention establishes the principle that
women's fundamental rights include that of State protection from
domestic violence. 16 1
Under the Women's Convention, family
violence includes any act of physical, mental, or sexual violence
occurring within the family unit. 16 2
In a domestic violence
context, the fundamental rights at issue under the Women's
Convention are the right to bodily integrity and the right to
equality before the law. 16 3 The Committee on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the
organization
monitoring
compliance
with the
Women's
Convention, interprets that instrument as requiring state
protection from domestic violence carried out or tolerated by
public or private actors. 164

159. The Women's Convention calls for judicial and legislative assistance on
all fronts where domestic violence is an issue. Women's Convention, supra note
132, at 193. This result is far more strident than the general "access" issues
presented in Airey because it also incorporates governmental responsibility to
expand current protection, with the ultimate goal being elimination of domestic
violence instead of merely improved access to protection. See Culliton, supranote

133, at 511 (explaining that the Women's Convention mandates a fundamental
right of women to free from domestic violence). This process is referred to as
Forward Looking Strategy.
160.
Both items came into existence in 1979. See Airey, 32 Eur. Ct. H.R. at
16; Women's Convention, supranote 132.
161.
Such a right is encompassed by the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the Women's Convention. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217A (11), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc A/810 (1948), art. 8; General
Recommendation, supra note 154, at para. 24(b); see also Culliton, supra note
133, at 513-14, 526 (discussing state responsibility for domestic violence under
the Universal Declaration, the Women's Convention, and customary international
law).
162.
See General Recommendation, supranote 154, at para. 23 (describing
types of abuse against women in family contexts).
163.
See Culliton, supranote 133, at 514. Culliton points out an argument
that a failure to protect against domestic violence discriminates against women.
Id. Even without such a discrimination argument, however, a failure to protect
against domestic violence could violate the right to bodily integrity. Id. Culliton
finds that such a discrimination argument bolsters the bodily integrity claim and
the overall conclusion that failure to protect against domestic violence constitutes
a violation of fundamental human rights. Id.
164.
See General Recommendation, supra note 154, at para. 10 (stating
that, under the Convention, there is an "obligation to eliminate discrimination in
all its terms"); see also Culliton, supranote 133, at 513 (stating that the Women's
Convention obligates States to "protect individuals from human rights violators"
(emphasis in original)). In domestic violence cases the human rights violators are
the abusers. See Culliton, supranote 133, at 513 (referring to domestic abuse as
a human rights problems). Some argue that "private" acts of domestic abuse are
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The overall purpose of the Women's Convention is to motivate
governmental change with regard to all forms of discrimination
against women. 16 5
For example, Article 1 of the Women's
Convention prohibits de facto discrimination by states that violate
women's fundamental rights. 16 6
The CEDAW interpretation of
this article reaches domestic violence that affects women
disproportionately." 167 While the Women's Convention focuses
specifically on women's rights, the instrument generally
recognizes that the right to protection from domestic violence is a
universal fundamental right.
The right to protection from
domestic violence implicates the right to freedom from
discrimination. 168 The right to bodily integrity also resides within
6 9
the right to protection from domestic violence.1
Through insistence on these rights as fundamental, the
Women's
Convention
recognizes
that
domestic
violence
constitutes an affront to international human rights norms. The
mandate of the Women's Convention is equally clear. Under this
instrument, domestic governments must reform aspects of their
legislative regimes that inadequately protect female victims of
domestic abuse. 170
This reform mandate entails not only the
revision of current legislation, but also the enactment of
legislation that ensures effective access to civil and criminal
relief. 17 1 Additionally, the Women's Convention requires states
to prosecute domestic violence adequately and to protect against
continued abuse. 172
The Divorce Bill fails to provide the protection for domestic
abuse victims required by the Women's Convention. The Bill
subjects abused spouses, the majority of whom are women, 173 to

truly vestiges of legislative or political tolerance of violence against women. See
Charlotte Bunch, Women's Rights as Human Rights: Toward a Re-vision of Human
Rights, 12 HUM. RTs. Q. 486, 491 (1990) (noting that feminists have argued this).
165.
See Culliton, supranote 133, at 528.
166. Women's Convention, supranote 132, art. 1.

167. Culliton, supra note 133, at 514 n.29 (quoting the General
Recommendation).
168. See General Recommendation, supranote 154, at para. 7.
169. Id. at para. 7(b) (including torturer in its discussion of gender-based
violence).
For a discussion regarding the similarities between the CEDAW
interpretation of torture and the European Court of Human Rights interpretation,
see Culliton, supranote 133, at 553-55.

170. See Culliton, supranote 133, at 540 (explaining that stock must enact
measures to eliminate discrimination against women).
171. See General Recommendation, supra note 154, at para. 24(r)(I). The
provision provides for "[c]riminal penalties where necessary and civil remedies in
case of domestic violence." Id.
172. See Culliton, supranote 133, at 539.
173. See supra note 49 for a discussion of the prevalence of spousal abuse
against women in Ireland.
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the same waiting period and mediation provisions that nonabused spouses face. 17 4 This requirement discriminates against
abused spouses because they face unique physical dangers
exacerbated
by
prolonged
marriages
and
face-to-face
confrontations. 1 75 This result, in itself, renders the Divorce Bill
violative of the Women's Convention. 176
The Women's
Convention requires governments to protect proactively the
177
victims of domestic violence by sweeping legislative reform.
Therefore, with regard to marital unions marked by domestic
violence, Ireland must amend the Divorce Bill's waiting period and
mediation provisions to bring the Bill into compliance with the
Women's Convention.
The Women's Convention's viability as an enforcement
mechanism, however, is questionable. The Women's Convention
and CEDAW recommendations are enforced proactively through
State-provided reports. 7 8s
CEDAW uses these reports to exert
political pressure on noncomplying States, but CEDAW has no

additional enforcement powers. 17 9

Therefore, it is unlikely that

the Women's Convention, standing alone, could compel Ireland to
amend the Divorce Bill.
In contrast, the Women's Convention does expand on notions
expressed by the European Court of Human Rights in Airey. The
court's explicit recognition of the Women's Convention would
provide binding force to the ideals articulated within that
instrument.18s
Such recognition plausible.
The Women's
Convention, like Airey, recognizes that protection from domestic

174. Family Law (Divorce) Bill, No. 32(c) (1966).
175. For a discussion of the discriminatory effect of mediation and extensive
waiting periods on abused spouses, see supraPart II.B.
176. Because most abused spouses are female, the Divorce Bill will give rise

to violent behavior that "affects women disproportionately." This result is
contrary to the Women's Convention's antidiscrimination stance. See General
Recommendation, supra note 154. Resultant violence against women could also

be seen as a vestige of a "patriarchy" that tacitly accepts such violence. See
Bunch, supra note 164, at 491. For a general discussion of discrimination
questions with regard to the Women's Convention, see generally Rebecca J. Cook,
Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, 30 VA. J. INTL L. 643 (1990).
177. General Recommendation, supra note 154, at para. 12.

178. For a discussion of the Women's Convention as an enforcement tool,
see Culliton, supranote 133, at 528.
179. Id. The Culliton article cites the problem the CEDAW has in obtaining
state reports. Id. at 528 n.99 (citing Bunch, supranote 164, at 496).
180. See Heifer, supra note 122, at 133-34. Contracting states respect
European Court of Human Rights decisions by taking any number of

governmental actions, including legislative reform. See generally Fredrik G.E.
Sundberg, The EuropeanExperience of HumanRights Proceedings:The Value of the
EuropeanCourt's Decisions,20 AKRON L. REv. 629, 633-42 (1987).
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abuse is a fundamental right. Airey required the government to
remove financial barriers to assertions of rights guaranteed by the
European Convention. While Airey implies that governments
must remove other barriers to such rights, the question remains
as to what extent the government must act. The Women's
Convention outlines international expectations
regarding
legislation that fails to protect domestic violence victims.1 8 1 The
European Court of Human Justice uses such documents in
delineating both the scope of fundamental rights and the
protections those rights merit. Therefore, while the Women's
Convention has little enforcement value, it supports a finding that
the Divorce Bill violates the European Convention under Airey.
IV. CONCLUSION

Ireland took a step toward becoming a more progressive
nation by providing for divorce. Due to its restrictive nature,
however, this step disserves those who arguably have the most
compelling need for divorce-the victims of spousal abuse. The
Irish government should expedite the divorce procedure in Ireland
for abused spouses and eliminate divorce mediation systems at
the abuser's disposal. This recommendation comports with
traditional Irish notions of equality, bodily integrity, and right to
life. Additionally, such reform would conform better to Article 8 of
the European Convention and international human rights norms
articulated by the Women's Convention.
Anthony Tyler Barnes

181.

See supranote 163.
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